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1 THE EMERGENCE OF AN INTERGENERATIONAL
DIVIDE
During seven years of economic crisis, the inter-
generational income and wealth divide has
increased in many European Union countries. In
the bloc as a whole, young people on average
have become significantly poorer, while poverty
among pensioners has been reduced (Figure 1).
Unemployment among the under-25s has risen
notably while older workers (aged 5-64) have
been less affected (Figure 2). While this pattern
has been particularly pronounced in southern
Europe, it can also be observed for the European
Union as a whole.
In the EU as a whole, unemployment in the 15-24
age group increased by 7.8 percentage points
between 2007 and 2013, peaking at 23.7 percent
in 2013, while unemployment among older work-
ers in the 50-64 age group increased somewhat
less, by 2.4 percentage points to 7.8 percent in
2013. A more precise measure of forced inactivity
of young people is the 'not in employment, edu-
cation or training' (NEET) rate, which varies signif-
icantly between countries. In the countries most
hit by the crisis (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy and
Spain), the NEET rate increased by more than 7
percentage points between 2007 and 2013, peak-
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ing at over 20 percent in Greece and Italy (Figure
2). By contrast, the NEET rate declined in Germany
in the same period, from 8.9 to 6.3 percent.
Material deprivation rates are typically higher for
young people than for those aged 65 or over
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Figure 1: Pre and post-crisis material deprivation
rate and unemployment rate in the EU
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: The material
deprivation rate is defined as the enforced inability (rather than
the choice not) to pay for at least three of: unexpected
expenses; a one-week annual holiday away from home; a meal
involving meat, chicken or fish every second day; adequate
heating; durable goods such as washing machines, colour
televisions, telephones or cars; or being confronted with
payment arrears.
0
5
10
15
20
25
BG IT RO HR SK ES LV UK HU MT GR BE PT IE FR PL CY DE EE SE AT LT FI CZ SI LU DK NL
2007 2013
Figure 2: 15-24 year olds not in employment, education or training (%)
Source: Eurostat.
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(Figure 1). In 2007, 20 percent of young people
below the age of 18 were materially deprived,
compared to 16 percent of people aged over 65.
As with the NEET rates, there are major differences
between countries. While less than 10 percent of
young people faced poverty in Denmark, Finland
and Sweden in 2007 (the proportion is even
smaller for older people), more than 20 percent of
young and old people were materially deprived in
Cyprus, Greece and Portugal. In Latvia, Hungary
and Poland about 40 percent of young people
were poor.
Figure 3 shows the percentage change per coun-
try in the material deprivation rate during the crisis
(2007-13). The rate increased substantially more
for the young compared to the old, especially in
the countries hit most by the crisis (except Ire-
land), meaning that already high levels before the
crisis in those countries were exacerbated. Only
Italy and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom
experienced deteriorating ratios for both the
young and old. By contrast, Finland and Sweden,
with low levels to start with, saw their respective
material deprivation rates decline for both young
and old people over the same period. The same is
valid for Poland1.
Overall, a worrying picture emerges. First, poverty
indicators have shown the emergence of an inter-
generational divide, especially in crisis-hit south-
ern Europe. Second, unemployment has become
a major concern, with young people hit hardest
during the crisis in the most stressed countries.
Surges in youth unemployment and youth
poverty are particularly worrying because they
have long-lasting effects on productivity and
1. Poland was the only EU
country with a growing
economy during the crisis,
which might explain this
development.
potential growth, marking young people for their
lifetimes, reducing their productivity and often
excluding them from the labour market for an
extended period of time (Bell and Blanchflower,
2010; Arulampalam, 2001; Gregg and Tominey,
2005). Youth unemployment and poverty also
have negative effects on fertility rates and demo-
graphics, possibly because of increased income
uncertainty related to unemployment and subse-
quent decisions to delay starting a family
(Kreyenfeld and Andersson, 2014; Currie and
Schwandt, 2014). The cost for the EU of a large
proportion of NEETs is therefore much greater than
the immediate short-term loss of foregone eco-
nomic activity (Darvas and Wolff, 2014). 
2 KEY DRIVERS OF THE INTERGENERATIONAL
DIVIDE
The intergenerational divide that has emerged
during the crisis has been driven by three impor-
tant policy developments. The first is macroeco-
nomic management. Unemployment responds to
the business cycle, but youth unemployment
reacts much more strongly to recessions than
total unemployment. This is in part because
younger workers disproportionately are on tem-
porary contracts (Boeri, 2011). Other factors also
matter, such as the difficulty for young people to
prove their skills in recessionary periods when
they are looking for work. Therefore, the intergen-
erational divide typically grows in times of reces-
sion. Second, structural changes to government
spending are important. Fiscal consolidation
measures in the EU during the crisis led to an
increase in poverty rates (Darvas and
Tschekassin, 2015). This raises the question of
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Figure 3: Change in material deprivation rate (2007-13, %)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
2. As also highlighted by
Begg, Mushövel and Niblett
(2015).
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whether government spending has become less
favourable for the young, increasing the share of
materially deprived young people. Third, pension
system reforms are hugely important for inter-
generational equity. In the following, we deal with
each of the three issues in turn.
Macroeconomic management
In times of crisis, generally speaking, the public
sector steps in to smooth the impact of adverse
developments, through automatic welfare policies
(such as unemployment benefits), progressive
taxation and discretionary policies such as invest-
ment programmes. Automatic stabilisers were
broadly at work in the EU during the financial crisis
in 2008 and 2009. However, during the sovereign
debt crisis, budgets became constrained in some
countries and they arguably cut government
spending more quickly than would have been
advisable from a stabilisation point of view. This
substantially aggravated the recessions in those
countries and increased unemployment and
youth unemployment (Darvas and Wolff, 2014).
In terms of investment, Darvas and Barbiero
(2014) found that gross public investment
declined in the EU during the European debt crisis,
and even collapsed in the most vulnerable coun-
tries, exaggerating the output fall.
The composition of government spending
Table 1 shows the percentage point change in the
composition of government spending in the EU
from 2008 to 2013. Unsurprisingly, Greece, Ire-
land and Portugal, which experienced the
sharpest fiscal consolidation in the euro area, and
Italy saw unemployment expenditure increase
substantially as a share of total expenditure as
their unemployment rates soared. Spending on
health grew in importance in the core countries
(see Table 1 for definitions) and the United King-
dom, while it fell substantially in the programme
countries, on the back of fiscal consolidation
measures. The share of spending on education
decreased slightly in the EU overall and fell sub-
stantially in the UK and Italy. The UK and the pro-
gramme countries reduced their spending on
families and children. By contrast, pensioners
were the main beneficiaries of fiscal adjustments.
Spending on this category increased in all coun-
tries and exceeded the EU average in the UK, the
programme countries and, to a lesser extent, cen-
tral and eastern European countries2. The compo-
sition of government spending therefore shifted
from families and children and education towards
pensioners, entrenching the intergenerational
divide.
Pension reforms
Government expenditure on pensions can
increase because pensions are considered to be
more difficult to change than other benefits from a
political point of view. Several member states
introduced pension reforms during the crisis. Such
reforms can benefit current pensioners at the
expense of future generations or vice versa. The
most important pension reforms happened in the
stressed countries, especially in Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain, because the crisis highlighted
that their pension systems were not sustainable.
From an intergenerational perspective, these
reforms typically aim at increasing the
sustainability of pension systems by reducing
implicit debt obligations, and should therefore
Table 1: General government expenditures by function, percentage point changes in composition,
from 2008 to 2013
EU*
Programme
countries
Italy
Core
countries
United
Kingdom
CEE Nordics
Health -0.2 -2.5 -0.5 0.7 1.3 -0.4 -0.1
Education -0.4 -0.3 -1.1 -0.1 -1.0 -0.3 -0.6
Old age 2.1 2.9 1.8 1.1** 3.0 2.3 2.2
Family and children -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -1.2 0.3 -0.4
Unemployment 0.6 1.1 1.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat gov_10a_exp database. Note: expenditure on family and children is defined as provision of social pro-
tection in the form of cash or in-kind benefits to households with dependent children, cash benefits such as maternity allowances,
parental leave, benefits geared towards child care. Education excludes spending on tertiary education. * EU refers to 27 member states
excluding Romania (because of data limitations). ** excluding the Netherlands. Programme countries = GR, ES, PT; core countries = BE,
DE, FR, NL, AT; CEE = BG, CZ, HU, PL, SI, SK; Nordics = DK, SE, FI.
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3. From an intergenerational
perspective, the public-pri-
vate mix in pension
schemes is not an issue per
sé, if appropriate regulation
obliges the collectively pri-
vately funded schemes to
integrate an intergeneration
risk-sharing element in their
set-up (Schokkaert and van
Parijs, 2003).
4. These numbers are taken
from the European Commis-
sion Ageing report (2015
and 2009); see Table 2 in
the annex.
5. The information in this
box draws on Schokkaert
and Van Parijs (2003) and
Myles (2002). Vandebrouke
and Rinaldi (2015) discuss
shortly the limits of the
Musgrave principle.
favour the young and future generations. In
general, a successful reform should increase
sustainability while not compromising adequacy
of future pensions.
Moreover, all of this has to be understood in the
context of rising EU life expectancy and declining
fertility, which represent major challenges to
future pension and health systems. The European
Commission's Ageing Report (2015) states that
the EU will move from four working-age people per
person over 65 today to about two working-age
people in 2040. This will affect both revenue and
spending: there will be less revenue because of
the shrinking working-age population, and more
spending because of higher costs for pensions,
health and long-term care. To address these chal-
lenges, several EU member states have enlarged
the role of pre-funded, privately managed
schemes as opposed to the prevailing statutory,
public, pay-as-you-go schemes (OECD, 2014)3.
There are, however, clear limits to what such
schemes can achieve.
To see to what extent the intergenerational divide
has been affected by reforms in the crisis years,
we carried out an analysis of changes to benefit
ratios, meaning the ratio of the income of pen-
sioners to the income of the active working popu-
lation (Box 1) Pension reforms that do not affect
intergenerational equity should leave the benefit
ratio unchanged. We considered (a) how the cur-
rent benefit ratio changed over the crisis period,
(b) how the 2060 benefit ratio changed over the
same period and (c) how the relationship between
the two ratios has changed. It is the latter that best
captures the ongoing intergenerational changes
in the pension system.
Figure 4 compares the benefit ratios in 2007 and
forecasts for 2060 to their current counterparts,
the 2013 benefit ratios and their respective 2060
forecasts4. In 2060, current 20-year olds will be
approaching or already in retirement, making it a
useful year to discern the effect of current reforms
on today’s young. A perfectly equitable pension
scheme should safeguard the benefit ratio for
BOX 1: THE MUSGRAVE RULE AND THE BENEFIT RATIO
To address the generational divide, we need to identify a stable and equitable intergenerational con-
tract that assures the well-being of the elderly, without crowding out resources for the young. The
Musgrave rule helps in that respect, stating that efficient risk-sharing between different generations
means keeping invariant the ratio of the income of the retirees to the net income of the working pop-
ulation (the so-called ‘benefit-ratio’). The example below illustrates this5.
Let’s assume a country has a pay-as-you-go system designed either with defined benefits (ie pre-
determined pension payments) or a fixed contribution rate (ie pension payments are not guaranteed
but are determined by the amount paid in). Imagine now an unpredictable shock affecting the
younger generation. In a defined benefits set-up, the cost will fall on the younger generation, as con-
tribution rates increase to keep the defined benefit level. In a fixed contribution set-up, the cost will
fall entirely on the older generation, as fewer contributions are paid in, reducing the benefits paid
out to pensioners. In a system that reflects the Musgrave rule, both contributions and benefits are
set so that they maintain a constant benefit ratio. Therefore, when a negative shock hits the younger
generation, the contribution rates for the younger generation rise, but benefits for the older genera-
tion must decrease too, to keep the benefit ratio constant. Both parties ‘lose’ at the same rate, allo-
cating the burden in an equitable way.
The benefit ratio as provided by the European Commission is defined as the average pension bene-
fit divided by an economy-wide average wage. It is crucial for the pension expenditure projection
exercise as outlined in the Ageing Report (European Commission, 2015), which captures three impor-
tant aspects of pension schemes: (a) the assumed increases in average pensions because of index-
ation rules and longer contribution periods, (b) changes in the average wage driven by assumptions
of labour productivity growth rates, and (c) changes in the structure of the respective population
groups. Both the 2007/2060 benefit ratio and the 2013/2060 benefit ratio are based on European
Commission estimates.  
6. The benefit ratio also
varies because of demo-
graphics and labour market
movements. Comparing the
two projection exercises,
the old-age dependency
ratio assumed in 2013 for
2060 is lower than that
assumed in 2007 for 2060,
suggesting better-than-
expected demographics.
However, labour market
developments worsened,
especially in Greece. 
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Germany reduced its 2013/2060 benefit ratio
compared to 2007/2060 for both current and
future pensioners, not changing the bias towards
current pensioners significantly.
Denmark moved towards a more just intergenera-
tional burden-sharing, by reducing the benefit
ratio of future pensioners, while Sweden reduced
entitlements for current and future pensioners,
without improving its position. Romania and Hun-
gary moved from balanced burden-sharing to sig-
nificantly favouring current pensioners, while
Bulgaria and Poland curtailed entitlements for
both current and future pensioners, not affecting
their intergenerational burden-sharing. A notable
and important exception is Italy: compared to its
2007/2060 benefit ratio, its ratio for 2013/2060
marked the greatest shift among EU countries
towards a more just intergenerational position.
Italy achieved sustainability in its pension system
not by cutting the future benefit ratio, but by
reducing the current benefit ratio, thus improving
intergenerational burden-sharing (see the Annex
for more details).
This analysis suggests that overall entitlements
have been curtailed in many countries to address
sustainability questions, but the burden seems
not to have been shared equally, favouring current
over future pensioners, especially in crisis-hit
southern Europe (Italy being an exception).
3 WAYS FORWARD: POLICIES TO ADDRESS THE
INTERGENERATIONAL DIVIDE
Measures to address the intergenerational divide
could include policies against youth unemploy-
ment, rebalancing spending and more equal
burden-sharing between generations in pension
scheme designs.
One of the biggest legacies of the crisis is high
youth unemployment. Bentolila et al (2010) and
Boeri (2011) argue that the tw o-tier system with
ultra-secure permanent workers and vulnerable
temporary workers (who are often the young
entering the labour market) is a major factor
behind the high rate of job losses among younger
workers during recessions. It also suggests a pos-
sible solution: labour market reforms that allow for
graded job security as workers acquire tenure.
those that will retire in or around 2060, keeping it
the same as the current ratio.
In 2013, Denmark, most continental welfare
states and the United Kingdom were close to the
45 degree line and can therefore be considered to
have relatively equitable pension systems. All
other countries were below the 45 degree line,
indicating a bias towards today’s pensioners,
resulting from a smaller future benefit ratio com-
pared to today’s ratio.
Analysing how the ratio has changed during the
crisis allows us to track the impact of pension
reforms and other factors on the intergenerational
justice of the pension system6. Compared to
2007/2060 benefit ratios, the countries most
under stress from the crisis reduced their
2013/2060 benefit ratios. Greece moved from a
benefit ratio biased towards future generations in
2007 towards a benefit ratio that favours current
pensioners (also highlighted in Figure 4). Spain
and Cyprus moved from a more-or-less balanced
position in 2007 to a system biased in favour of
current pensioners, while Portugal increased its
benefit ratio for both current and future
pensioners, not changing the burden-sharing
between generations in a significant way.
Meanwhile, Belgium did not change its position,
while Austria curtailed entitlements for current
pensioners, moving closer to the 45 degree line.
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Figure 4: All pensions benefit ratio, 2007/2060
and 2013/2060 (%)
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission Ageing
Report (2009 and 2015 edition). Note: the benefit ratios take
into account both private and public schemes.
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7. In 2013, the European
Commission called for
giving all young people up
to age 25 continuing educa-
tion, an apprenticeship or a
traineeship within four
months of leaving formal
education. This could foster
the establishment of voca-
tional training programmes
and policies that help
young people to find jobs,
especially in countries
which have not had such
provisions before. See the
Council recommendation
establishing the Youth Guar-
antee: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content
/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32
013H0426(01)&from=EN.
8. A March 2015 European
Court of Auditors report
questions the adequacy of
the total funding (€12.7 bil-
lion from 2014 to 2020) of
the Youth Guarantee, how
its target is defined and the
way monitoring and imple-
mentation are proceeding.
See
http://www.eca.europa.eu/
Lists/ECADocuments/INSR1
5_03/INSR15_03_EN.pdf.
9. As pointed out by
Vandebrouke and Rinaldi
(2015), Belgium is
proposing a pension reform
for 2020-2040 along the
lines of the Musgrave rule.
while it should ensure that countries provide
adequate stabilisation for the area as a whole.
For countries outside the euro area, fiscal policy,
monetary policy and the exchange-rate channel
should play their full role in mitigating shocks. 
In terms of burden-sharing between generations,
we have found that current pensioners have been
protected compared to future pensioners (Italy
being an exception). Safeguarding a constant ben-
efit ratio over generations by adjusting contribu-
tion rates for the working population and benefit
levels for pensioners would enable better inter-
generational burden-sharing9. This would coun-
teract the limitations of existing fixed-contribution
or defined-benefits schemes, under which adjust-
ment would eventually fall only on the younger or
on the older generation. Following a Musgrave rule,
rising unemployment among the younger gener-
ation would mean that the contribution rates for
the younger generation rise, but benefits for the
older generation would decrease too, to keep the
benefit ratio constant. Therefore, both parties
‘lose’ at the same rate, allocating the burden in an
equitable way.
However, it is not only pension reforms along the
lines outlined above that are needed. As noted by
Myles (2002), the aggregate well-being of future
generations depends primarily on the quality and
quantity of the stock of productive assets (includ-
ing human and environmental capital) that they
inherit or create, and not so much on the design of
pension systems. We have shown that during the
crisis, social spending on families and children,
and on education, was preserved less in the UK
and in Italy, and held constant in the countries that
faced the highest youth unemployment rates. By
contrast, policies aimed at education and child
care, one of the pillars of the social investment
strategy, could play a major role in addressing the
intergenerational divide. Children are the future
workforce, and investing in better education and
affordable child care will lead to higher levels of
productivity and employment (Hemerijck, 2013).
However, such reforms are unlikely to yield sig-
nificant job benefits in a situation of depressed
demand. Other measures to counteract youth
unemployment, such as the Youth Guarantee7, are
a step in the right direction but are hardly ade-
quate as a counterweight to national policies; in
addition, the European Court of Auditors has ques-
tioned the adequacy of such policies8. 
Beyond such structural measures, adequate
macroeconomic policies are important in order to
prevent a significant increase in unemployment.
In the context of the euro-area crisis, some sort of
shock absorber on the euro-area level could have
helped mitigate the adverse impact on the
economices of member states. In the short term,
we are sceptical about creating major European
stabilisation functions such as a European
unemployment insurance scheme (Claeys et al,
2014). Such measures, such as the euro-area
unemployment insurance scheme proposed by
former European commissioner Laszlo Andor,
could prove effective but would require an
extraordinary effort to create harmonised
European labour market legislation.
Instead, for the euro area we would recommend
an enhanced, symmetric and binding policy
coordination framework for fiscal policy, as
outlined in Sapir and Wolff (2015). The main
reason we advocate this step is that 98 percent of
EU government spending is national.
Macroeconomic stabilisation therefore works
through national budgets. It is of central
importance that national public finance is
cautiously managed in good times, in order to
have enough fiscal leeway in bad times. However,
a system relying exclusively on national policies
would be inadequate for the monetary union for
two reasons: Irresponsible fiscal policy can have
substantial cross-border spillover effects; and the
sum of national fiscal deficits does not add up to
an adequate fiscal stance for the euro area as a
whole. A deeper coordination framework that is
binding in exceptional times should therefore be
created, to prevent unsustainable fiscal policies,
‘Current pensioners have been protected compared to future pensioners. Safeguarding a
constant benefit ratio by adjusting contribution rates for the working population and benefit
levels for pensioners would enable better intergenerational burden-sharing.’
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Education is also important as a policy measure
to reduce income inequality. By increasing access
to high-quality education, greater equality of
opportunity is fostered, which in turn contributes
positively to economic growth (OECD, 2015a).
Also, as pointed out by Vandenbroucke and Rinaldi
(2015), investing in education and child care can
reduce intergenerational gaps.
Overall, we are concerned that the crisis has left a
dangerous intergenerational legacy. Addressing
this legacy by making the government spending
mix fairer for the younger generation while re-
establishing intergenerational equity in pension
schemes, should be a priority for policymakers
throughout much of the European Union.
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ANNEX I: An overview of Italy’s 2011 pension reform
By Elsa Fornero
In November 2011, Italian public finances were near collapse and the country’s political system was
in a stalemate. Financial operators were turning their backs on Italian sovereign debt auctions and the
few who took part were demanding exaggerated interest rates, so that the interest paid by Italy on its
new 10-year bonds exceeded the interest paid by Germany on similar bonds by a spread of 500 basis
points (more than three times the spread in July 2015). Italy had (and still has) to refinance on aver-
age over €1 billion per day of its huge public debt and its well-tested system for doing so was under
massive attack. The possibility that interest might not be paid and that expiring bonds might not be
reimbursed was very real; pensions and civil service salaries were at risk, while central and local admin-
istrations were already unable to pay suppliers.
The financial crisis came on top of a slow industrial decline that had been afflicting Italy for about 20
years. Italy had cut its research and development expenditures, got out of high-productivity sectors
such as electronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals and concentrated on labour-intensive fashion-
oriented ‘made in Italy’ products, encountering increasingly stiff competition from developing countries.
When the technocratic government of Mario Monti took office (16 November 2011), pension reform
was a key priority. The reform had to be far-reaching enough to convince European partners and finan-
cial markets that Italy deserved to be trusted as a debtor, but sensible enough to obtain the (albeit
reluctant) approval of the parliament and the public. It had to realise immediate savings in pension
expenditure and future savings in the coming decades, thus reducing the burden on the young and on
subsequent generations. It had to eliminate or drastically reduce the distortions still embedded in the
system after 20 years of reasonable but too-gradual reforms.
The reform (law 214/2011) speeded up the transition to the notional defined contribution (NDC) system
by extending the DC method of benefit calculation to all workers (including members of Parliament) as
of 1 January 2012. This was very important to restore credibility to the formula, still largely unfamiliar
to the people and considered ‘too severe’ by politicians. The reform also significantly raised statutory
retirement ages and largely eliminated so-called seniority pensions, which were based on the number
of years worked, mostly irrespective of age; it aligned, as of 2018, the retirement ages of women to
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those of men; and it indexed all retirement requisites to changes in life expectancy. To make things fair
once again with respect to past ‘generous’ defined benefit pensions, the reform established a ‘solidar-
ity contribution’ for people receiving very large pensions. It also froze for two years the indexing of pen-
sions to prices, excluding only pensions under €1,400 per month. These last two measures were later
nullified by the Constitutional Court, but  substantially re-established by the subsequent governments.
As a result, according to international evaluations, the Italian pension system is now financially sus-
tainable. Most families had to revise lifetime financial expectations downward to take into account the
new situation. Because of the financial emergency, there was little time for social dialogue, parlia-
mentary debate (the reform was presented to parliament as a government decree and approved in just
a few weeks through a vote of confidence) or the transition period that is customary in pension reforms.
The absence of a transition period caused problems for workers who were already displaced from their
job, were in a mobility scheme, were expecting to retire within a few years or who had, at some point in
their working life, voluntarily left their job, trusting that pension laws would remain unchanged. The
reform established a safeguard clause for 65,000 workers, according to an estimate by the Istituto
Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale, the national pension office. It turned out later that the number was
much too small, since many individual and some collective agreements between workers and employ-
ers had been concluded without any formal registration. The press and public opinion lumped all cases
together, calling this group ‘Esodati’, referring to a forced exodus from the labour market, and consid-
ered all of them as equally deserving of being safeguarded, irrespective of their different situations
and, in particular, because many of them had voluntarily left their job, often in exchange for a lump
sum to be added to their severance pay. In subsequent provisions, the government added another
65,000 workers to the safeguard clause, for a total of 130,000 safeguarded workers. The subsequent
government further increased the number to almost 160,000.
Despite widespread protests, the trade unions did not call for a general strike. The reform reduced the
implicit pension debt and also challenged the ‘lump of labour fallacy’, a basic premise of past pension
legislation and a frequent assertion in public debate that such a reform would reduce the number of jobs
available to the young by keeping older workers at work longer. Obviously, the extension of working
life requires additional measures to stimulate the demand for older workers, something that is more dif-
ficult in a period of recession.
The approval of the ‘Rescue Italy’ decree, of which the pension reform was a fundamental part, resulted
in a marked reduction in the interest rate spread and was a fundamental factor behind the European
Commission terminating in May 2012 the infringement procedure that had been started in 2009 against
Italy for running an excessive deficit.
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ANNEX II: projected benefit ratios
Table 2: Projected benefit ratios, 2007-2060 and 2013-2060
2007 2060 2013 2060
Belgium 45 43 45 43
Bulgaria 44 41 37 32
Czech Rep. 45 38 43 41
Denmark 64 75 62 64
Germany 51 42 41 36
Estonia 26 22 31 25
Ireland 27 32 30 27
Greece 73 80 58 44
Spain 62 57 65 40
France 63 48 53 39
Italy 68 47 59 53
Cyprus 54 57 75 42
Latvia 24 25 28 20
Lithuania 33 23 35 38
Luxembourg 46 44 57 58
Hungary 39 38 41 33
Malta 42 40 47 46
Netherlands 74 81 63 63
Austria 55 39 41 37
Poland 56 31 48 29
Portugal 47 33 62 42
Romania 29 43 37 26
Slovenia 41 40 38 33
Slovakia 45 40 46 30
Finland 49 47 49 42
Sweden 64 46 54 40
United Kingdom 35 37 34 33
Source: European Commission Ageing Report (2009 and 2015)
